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Abstract: Regulatory disasters are catastrophic events or series of events which have 
significantly harmful impacts on the life, health or financial wellbeing of individuals or the 
environment. They  are caused, at least in part, by failures in, or unforeseen consequences of, 
the design and /or operation of the regulatory system put in place to prevent those harmful 
effects from occurring. Regulatory disasters are horrendous for those affected by them.  
Because of that we have an obligation to learn as much from them as we can, notwithstanding 
all the well-known challenges related to policy and organisational learning. The article focuses 
on five distinct and unrelated regulatory disasters which, although they occurred in apparently 
unrelated domains or countries, contain insights for all regulators as the regulatory regimes 
share a common set of elements which through their differential configuration and interaction 
create the unique dynamics of that regime. In the regulatory disasters analysed here, these 
manifest themselves as six contributory causes, operating alone or together:  the incentives on 
individuals or groups; the organisational dynamics of regulators, regulated operators and the 
complexity of the regulatory system in which they are situated; weaknesses,  ambiguities and 
contradictions in the regulatory strategies adopted;  misunderstandings of the problem and the 
potential solutions;  problems with communication about the conduct expected, or conflicting 
messages; and trust and accountability structures. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2010 an explosion in the Pike River mine in New Zealand killed twenty nine 
people and, on the other side of the world, a blowout at the Macondo oil well 
killed eleven people and caused major environmental damage as four million 
barrels of oil spilled into the Gulf of Mexico. In 2005 a cloud of petrol vapour 
from the Buncefield tank storage depot in the south of England exploded over 
two major motorways early on a Sunday morning, which if it had happened at any 
other time could have caused significant loss of life. In 2008 the Royal Bank of 
Scotland (RBS), one of the UK’s largest banks, was rescued from collapse by a 
government bail-out of £46bn, a contributor to and casualty of the global financial 
crisis. In the mid-late 1990s to early 2000s poor building practices led to significant 
losses for homeowners in New Zealand caused by leaky buildings. Estimates of 
the losses range to as high as NZ$11.3bn.1  
These disastrous events from opposite sides of the globe seem to be 
disparate. Some are systemic failures across an industry, others are single events; 
some are low probability, high impact events, others high probability and low 
impact if measured as the impact per individual affected at a single point in time, 
but high impact if assessed on an aggregate basis across a number of individuals 
and a period of time. What they have in common is that they are all regulatory 
disasters: a catastrophic event or series of events which have significantly harmful 
impacts on the life, health or financial wellbeing of individuals or the environment, 
caused, at least in part, by a failure in the design and /or operation of the 
regulatory regime put in place to prevent their occurrence.    
Regulatory disasters can be a particular form of policy disaster. Policy 
disasters have been defined as the disastrous unintended consequences which 
occur as the direct consequence of poor intentional choices by top political 
decision-makers.2 Regulatory disasters may also be seen as a particularly acute 
form of a policy blunder.  King and Crewe, for example, define a ‘policy blunder’ 
as:  
 
an episode in which a government adopts a particular course of action in 
order to achieve one or more objectives, and as a result largely or wholly of 
its own mistakes, either fails completely to achieve those objectives or does 
achieve them but at a totally disproportionate cost, or else does achieve them 
but contrives at the same time to cause a significant amount of ‘collateral 
damage’ in the form of unintended or undesired consequences.3   
1 This is the estimate provided by PWC, see online at 
http://www.dbh.govt.nz/UserFiles/File/News/WHRS/pdf/PWC-weathertightness-estimating-cost-full-
report.pdf.  
2 Dunleavy, P. (1995) ,’Policy Disasters: Explaining the UK’s Record’, Public Policy and Administration 
10(2), 52. 
3 King, A and Crewe, I (2014), The Blunders of Our Governments (London: Oneworld) p.4. 
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However, the scale of their consequences means that ‘regulatory disasters’ are 
more than just ‘policy blunders’. They include disasters caused by ‘judgement calls’ 
as well as poor design and implementation and, as used here, ‘regulatory disasters’ 
deliberately excludes ‘political disasters’ – those which are disasters for the 
reputation or continued existence in power for the politicians or regulators 
involved. Many of the regulatory disasters highlighted here are also political 
disasters, but a policy which is purely or mainly a disaster in political terms is not 
included.    
Regulatory disasters are also distinct from policy disasters in that they occur 
in a particular sub-field of public policy, and indeed need not be confined to the 
state at all: they result from the unintended and unforeseen consequences of the 
design and / or operation of a regulatory system and its interactions with other 
systems. As such they can arises from poor decisions by politicians in the design 
of the regulatory regime and / or political influences on its operation, and / or 
poor decisions and practices by regulatory officials themselves within a system that 
may be either well or poorly designed. Regulation, or regulatory governance, is the 
organised attempt to manage risks or behaviour in order to achieve a publicly 
stated objective or set of objectives; a regulatory system consists of the (sometimes 
shifting) set of interrelated actors who are engaged in such attempts and their 
interactions with one another and the dynamic institutional and organisational 
environment in which they sit. Thus regulatory disasters also differ from public 
service delivery disasters, as they do not involve the delivery of services to the 
public directly organised by a government department, agency or authority; or that 
are provided on behalf of, financed and regulated by government,4 unless those 
disasters arise at least in part from failures in the design and / or operation of the 
regulatory system to which that public service, such as a hospital, is subject.     
Regulatory disasters are horrendous for those affected by them. Because of 
that, we have an obligation to learn as much from them as we can, 
notwithstanding all the well-known challenges related to policy and organisational 
learning. For regulators, probing the reasons for the disaster, even if it occurred in 
another country, or in a different regulatory domain, can provide insights for the  
evaluation of their own systems. They can also provide useful leverage for 
persuading political overseers of the need for change. Regulatory systems can have 
a significant number of ‘latent’ failures which only become apparent on the 
occurrence of a particular major event, such as an explosion or financial collapse, 
or through the recognition of an accumulation of a number of smaller events, such 
as individual deaths, smaller scale pollution events or individual financial losses.  
These are the disasters ‘which are waiting to happen’. Other disasters were not 
foreseen, but neither may they have been reasonably foreseeable, or involve ‘black 
4 Contrast Dunleavy P, Tinkler J, Gilson C, and Towers E,  ‘Understanding and Preventing Public Service 
Policy Disasters’, LSE Public Policy Group, available at http://www.academia.edu/2871538/.  
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swan’ events – what had been seen as low probability albeit high impact events.5    
Nonetheless, the inquiries that often follow a disaster, even if it is a ’black swan’ 
event,  often reveal systemic problems within the regime which have hence far 
gone unnoticed by regulators, or unheeded by key policy actors.     
Analysing the causes and nature of regulatory disasters also enables us to 
understand more about the nature of regulation itself. Although regulatory 
disasters often occur in apparently unrelated domains or countries, they can in fact 
contain lessons for all regulators, as regulatory regimes share a common set of 
elements which through their differential configuration and interaction create the 
unique dynamics of that regime. In the regulatory disasters analysed here, these 
manifest themselves as six contributory causes, operating alone or together: 
   
• The incentives on individuals or groups;  
• The organisational dynamics of regulators, regulated operators and the 
complexity of the regulatory system; 
• Weaknesses, ambiguities and contradictions in the regulatory strategies 
adopted; 
• Misunderstandings of the problem and the potential solutions; 
• Problems with communication about the conduct expected or conflicting 
messages; 
• Trust and accountability structures. 
 
The article focuses on five distinct and unrelated regulatory disasters: the 
construction of ‘leaky buildings’ in New Zealand in the late 1990s-2000s, the 
explosion at the Buncefield chemical plant in the UK in 2005, the events leading 
up to the bail out of the Royal Bank of Scotland in the UK in 2008, the Macondo 
oil well blow out at the Deepwater Horizon oil rig in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010, 
and Pike River mining tragedy in New Zealand, also in 2010.6 These are chosen 
because they are uncontroversial examples of regulatory disasters – significantly 
adverse impacts on human health, financial position or the environment which 
arose from the design and operation of a regulatory regime intended to manage 
the very risks which materialised. They also have the advantage that each was 
subject to extensive investigation by an independent body established specifically 
to inquire into the causes of the disaster, thus providing a wealth of factual 
information. Whilst there are always inherent biases in any investigation, those 
which followed each of these disasters have not been significantly criticised as 
biased or ‘captured’ by any particular interest.   
 
5 Taleb, N (2007), Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable (London: Penguin) 
6 Note that the lecture also included examples from the Mid-Staffordshire hospital inquiry in the UK, but 
this is omitted here for reasons of space: see Report of the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public 
Inquiry (2013) HC947. 
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THE INCENTIVES ON INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS 
 
In the aftermath of any disaster, there are normally calls from politicians and the 
public for individual liability to be imposed, for there to be some ‘heads to roll’.   
However, the role of individuals in causing or contributing to regulatory disasters 
is not straightforward. In some cases individuals may be a direct cause of a failure, 
for example ‘rogue traders’ such as Nick Leeson, whose trading activities brought 
down Barings Bank in 1995. However, there is a complex interaction between 
individuals and the organisational context in which they are operating, which 
makes separating out individual action difficult. In the regulatory disasters analysed 
here, individuals are often the proximate cause, but their actions are only an 
element in a series of interactions or events contributing to  the disaster.  
In particular, the organisational context can produce conflicting incentives 
which affect individual behaviour. The Pike River report found that individuals in 
the workforce were operating in a context in which production was more 
important than safety, for example.7 Conflicts of interests can exist within 
regulators as well as regulated firms. In the case of Deepwater Horizon, regulators 
were responsible both for awarding licences for deep water drilling and collecting 
the associated royalties, and for ensuring safety and environmental protections. 
The drive for royalty income was such that a culture of revenue production 
dominated safety or environmental concerns, to the extent that some offices 
developed a practice of taking ‘benefits in kind’ instead of royalties, leading to 
serious charges of abuse of government authority and even criminal misconduct.8 
In addition, individual pay and reward schemes were linked to the speed in which 
officials issued licences, distorting balanced decision making, particularly with 
respect to environmental impacts.9 As many regulatory activities are performed 
through individuals, it is not surprising that the decisions, actions and inactions of 
individuals play a role in producing regulatory disasters. But just to focus on 
individuals alone is to miss the significance of how their actions are governed by 
and interact with the broader organisational and institutional context in which they 
are situated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 Ibid, p.12. 
8 National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, Deepwater – the 
Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling, Report to the President (2011) (hereafter Deepwater Horizon 
report), p.77.  For a full discussion of the regulatory environment see chapter 3. 
9 Deepwater Horizon report, p.82. 
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ORGANISATIONAL DYNAMICS, INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT AND 
SYSTEM COMPLEXITY 
 
Organisations are mechanisms which translate individual actions into collective 
action by enabling them to be sustained over time.10 The organisational systems, 
processes and dynamics of both regulators and regulated operators (regulatees) 
have played a significant role in all the regulatory disasters analysed here, as have 
the dynamics of the inter-relationships between them within the regulatory system 
as a whole. The internal dynamics of organisations are in turn affected by their 
broader institutional context, including the wider regulatory system.  For firms, 
this is usually the markets in which they are operating. For regulators it includes 
their legal mandate and powers, their governance and accountability structures, the 
political context and their informal and formal relationships with other regulatory 
actors.   
That context can drive organisational dynamics and priorities in direct ways.  
In the case of Pike River, for example, the report found that whilst the ‘drive for 
production’ was a normal feature of coal mining, Pike River was in a particularly 
stressed economic situation as it was in ‘start up’ mode: it had only one mine, 
which was producing far less than had been forecast, and it was seeking to gain 
market credibility in order to raise capital.11 In such circumstances, directors and 
executive managers paid insufficient attention to health and safety risks. The 
market context can also have a systemic effect across an industry, with significant 
implications for how a regulatory regime operates in practice. For example, in the 
case of New Zealand’s ‘leaky buildings’ disaster, the Hunn report found that skill 
levels in the building sector had been declining, and that the changing practices 
within the market meant that builders were no longer overseen by professionals, 
such as surveyors and architects, as they had been in the past.12  
For regulators, it is the political and legal context which has most bearing on 
their organisational structures, processes and decision making. Often, the legal 
mandate and powers that regulators have is deficient in one or more ways. In the 
case of Pike River, the legal framework for health and safety regulation was 
criticised as too fragmented: those who issued licences to mine were not mandated 
to look at health and safety, so licences to mine were given without any scrutiny of 
health and safety. The regime may not include all of the risks that the activity 
poses: in the case of the Buncefield explosion, the report found that under the UK 
regulatory regime, societal risks (such as to health and safety of those living in the 
vicinity of the site) were not taken into account in the land use and planning 
decisions made with respect to high hazard sites. The legal mandate may also be 
10 Reed, M (2003), ‘The Agency/Structure Dilemma in Organization Theory: Open Doors and Brick 
Walls’ in Knudsen, C and Tsoukas, H, The Oxford Handbook on Organization Theory (Oxford: OUP). 
11 Pike River report, Executive Summary. 
12 Report of the Overview Group on the Weathertightness of Buildings to the Building Industry 
Authority (2002) (hereafter Hunn Report), p.9. 
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such that it creates significant conflicts of interest for the regulator. In the case of 
the Deepwater Horizon disaster, the Minerals Management Service was 
responsible for licensing and collecting royalties, and for environmental and health 
and safety regulation, and operated in a political context in which oil exploration, 
and preserving the royalties from that exploration, were the dominant concerns.13 
Conflicting incentives and objectives in legal mandates often stem from the 
political compromises brokered between conflicting parties which are then 
embodied in the governing legislation. As the Report to the President noted: 
‘From birth, MMS had a built-in incentive to promote offshore drilling in sharp 
tension with its mandate to ensure safe drilling and environmental protection.’14   
Furthermore, governments themselves can have vested interests that conflict with 
other goals. It is a notable theme throughout the regulatory disasters arising from 
the extraction industry (mining, oil drilling) that the conflicts of interest created by 
the government’s interests in mining or drilling for natural resources can override 
its role in preserving the environment or making decisions about the health and 
safety.15   
Legislators also impose a business model on regulators through their 
decisions on funding. Those funded directly from government are prey to cuts in 
resources, which has an obvious impact on their ability to perform their role.16  
The Report to the President concluded that the MMS had to pursue safety 
regulation on a ‘starvation diet’ due to Congress’s unwillingness to grant it 
appropriate resources.17 In the case of Pike River, for example, the government 
had reduced funding to the inspectorate and merged it with the broader 
Department of Labour. As a result, there were only two mining inspectors for the 
whole of New Zealand. But business models can be imposed in other ways.  Both 
environmental and health and safety regulators in the UK, for example, are under 
a legal requirement to recover the costs of their inspections. The report into the 
Buncefield explosion found that the legal requirement to recover costs ‘can have 
an unwanted effect upon regulatory activities and the relationship between the 
[regulators] and duty-holders’ and ‘induce tensions in the relationship with site 
operators’.18   
Even where the legal mandate is clear and a regulator has a full range of 
powers, the political context and accountability structures can have a significant 
impact on how the regulator interprets it mandate and uses its powers. In the case 
of the MMS, it tried more than once to amend the regulatory provisions to 
introduce the requirement for a safety case and other reforms, but was continually 
13 Deepwater Horizon Report, chapter 3.  
14 Ibid, p.56. 
15 Pike River report, vol II, p.267; Deepwater Horizon Report, p.85. 
16 See Deepwater Horizon report, chapter 3, for a discussion of the depletions of the MMS’s resources. 
17 Deepwater Horizon Report, p.72. 
18 The Report of the Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board into the Policy and Procedures of the Health and Safety 
Executive’s and the Environment Agency’s role in regulating the activities on the Buncefield site under COMAH 
Regulations (2012) (hereafter Buncefield report), p.66. 
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blocked by industry, Congress and the Office of Management and Budget.19 In the 
case of leaky buildings, the Hunn report reported that: 
 
Some territorial authorities and building certifiers hold the view that the 
certification process is constrained by a desire expressed by the BIA [the 
Building Industry Authority] to building officials that any change to the 
process must avoid putting inflationary pressure on building costs.20  
 
Overall, it concluded that ‘Political influence may be compromising standards’.21 
In the UK, although the Financial Services Authority had a broad legal mandate 
and a wide set of powers to regulate banks and other financial institutions, the 
report into the failure of the Royal Bank of Scotland found that the FSA had felt 
constrained from intervening too closely in RBS’s business model by politicians’ 
ambitions to preserve the City of London’s position as an international financial 
centre.22 In the US, royalty income from oil exploration was a highly lucrative 
source of revenue;23 in such a context, industry’s voice was allowed to frustrate 
attempts by the MMS to enhance regulation of their activities and the agency was 
never granted the political autonomy to resist them.24 
Whilst the political and legal context has a role to play in shaping 
organisational processes, cultures and decision making, a striking feature of all the 
regulatory disasters analysed here is the central role played by failures of 
governance and leadership within organisations, in both regulators and regulated 
firms. Critical are the skills and training of personnel, the resources of the 
organisation, weaknesses in leadership, and governance, including failures to 
manage risks strategically. Also striking are the consistent failures of organisations, 
particularly regulatory organisations, to coordinate in the operation of the 
regulatory system, failures which are exacerbated the more complex the system.    
With respect to internal failings of organisations, there are four central 
findings which are common both to regulators and regulated operators.   
First, and most obviously, culture matters. Organisations are internally 
complex and informal norms often dominate formal rules in the way activities are 
carried out and decisions are made. As a result, safety rules can be overridden 
when employees think they are unnecessary, as in Pike River.25 Or the culture 
drives decisions. In the case of the MMS, for example, environmental scientists 
19 Deepwater Horizon report, pp.71-73. 
20 Hunn Report, p.19. 
21 Ibid p.22 
22 FSA, The failure of the Royal Bank of Scotland: Financial Services Authority Board Report (2011), 
p.262 (hereafter RBS report). 
23 At the time the MMS was created, royalties for oil drilling were the second highest source of revenues 
for the US government: Deepwater Horizon report, p.63. 
24 Deepwater Horizon report, chapter 3. 
25 Pike River report, p.19. 
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within MMS stated that their managers believed that all environmental impact 
assessments should result in a ‘green light’ for drilling.26   
Secondly, the training, skills and expertise of personnel matters: organisations 
may simply lack people with appropriate expertise. This is a common feature in all 
the disasters, but it is notable that lack of training and expertise is often a more 
striking feature for regulators than it is for regulatees. This is frequently due to 
resources: disparities in pay between the regulator and industry can make  
recruitment difficult.27 However it can also be because those at the top of the 
organisation do not value specialist expertise, as in the case of the MMS in the 
US.28 Alternatively, organisations may have the expertise but those experts are not 
called upon to look at the appropriate problems, as in the case of the supervision 
of major hazard chemical sites in the UK, where environmental specialists were 
not called on at the appropriate times. The Buncefield investigation also found 
that experts from different disciplines can find it difficult to work together 
productively, and specialists may have little empathy or time for generalists, all of 
which can lead to conflicts over priorities and oversights.29 In contrast, generalists 
may disregard the calls for resources made by specialists, as they cannot see the 
need for them. The impact this has depends on where the expert or generalist is 
within the organisation. One feature of Pike River was that the line managers were 
generalists and so did not understand how to inspect mines, even limiting the 
travel budgets of the inspectors to inspect mines on the North Island on the basis 
that the resources came out of the South Island’s budget.30    
Thirdly, organisational failures usually come from the top. A central finding is 
the failure of leadership, in both regulators and regulated firms. For example, in 
the case of Pike River, the investigation found that ‘The board did not provide 
effective health and safety leadership and protect the workforce from harm.’31 The 
necessary information simply was lost as issues moved up the organisation, and as 
a result the Board could not assess or challenge assurances that had been given to 
it by management. An analysis of the failures of the boards of financial institutions 
in the wake of the financial crisis found exactly the same.32  Boards can also be 
distracted: in the case of Pike River, the Board was distracted by the financial and 
production pressures that confronted the company; in the case of RBS, by the 
gains to be made from the activities it was pursuing.  Regulators can be equally 
distracted: in the case of the FSA, the Board had focused most of its attention on 
dealing with legacy issues from the previous regime, and on retail and insurance 
regulation. Analysis of Board minutes for the years leading up to RBS’s rescue 
26 Deepwater Horizon report, p.82. 
27 See for example, Pike River report, p.29, 274-5; RBS report, p.24. 
28 Deepwater Horizon report, pp.77-78. 
29 Buncefield report, p.30. 
30 Pike River report, p.277. 
31 Pike River report, p.18; see also Hutter, B (2001) Regulation and Risk: Occupational Health and Safety on the 
Railways (Oxford: OUP). 
32 Senior Supervisors Group, Risk Management Lessons from the Global Banking Crisis of 2008 (October 2009); 
OECD, Corporate Governance and the Financial Crisis: Key Findings and Main Messages’ (June 2009). 
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found that the Board had devoted very little time to considering prudential 
regulation issues.33 In the case of Pike River, the absorption of the mining 
inspectorate into the generalist health and safety inspectorate, which was itself part 
of a much larger Department of Labour, meant that the Department did not focus 
sufficiently on health and safety issues.34    
Fourthly, organisations often take the path of least resistance, and as a result 
can fail to manage risks strategically. In the case of major hazard regulation (which 
for these purposes is taken to include financial supervision of systemically 
important banks), attention can focus more on the events that are ‘happening here 
and now’ rather than risks that events ‘may happen in the future’. The Board 
report into the supervision of RBS found that the Board focused more on legacy 
issues and retail misselling which demanded immediate attention, and as a result 
did not pay attention to prudential risks which were seen to be remote. In the 
context of more traditional major hazard industries, the Buncefield report 
provided a useful reminder that ‘Previous major incidents around the world such 
as Texas City, Longford (SE Australia) and Piper Alpha remind us that the task of 
controlling major hazard risks can become insidiously subverted by undue 
attention being paid to the less organisationally demanding issues of occupational 
safety’.35 This is not a problem confined to regulators: in both the case of RBS and 
BP, neither focused adequately on high impact, low probability events.36 
The complexity of the regulatory system can also be a key contributory 
element. In any regulatory system, multiple regulators will often have to interact, 
but for varying reasons fail to do so effectively, or even at all. As a result, inter-
organisational failures between regulators can be as significant as internal failures 
in regulators and regulatees in contributing to regulatory disasters. For example, in 
the case of Pike River, the investigation found that each regulator involved 
interpreted its mandate narrowly and did not share information with the other 
agencies involved.37 In the case of leaky buildings, the Hunn report found that 
split responsibilities for approving building consents and issuing certificates led to 
confusion about roles, responsibilities and processes.38 In the case of Deepwater 
Horizon, the overlapping jurisdictions of the MMS and the US Coastguard led to a 
requirement to continually renegotiate informal interagency agreements over an 
extended period and in effect expand the MMS’s jurisdiction, contributing to  its 
under-resourcing.39 
Furthermore, the different mandates of regulators may lead them to have 
differential priorities, which is a problem when they are meant to be jointly 
33 RBS Report, p.266. 
34 Pike River report, p.29. 
35 Buncefield report, Recommendation 22. 
36 Deepwater Horizon report; RBS report, and see House of Commons Energy and Climate Change 
Committee, UK Deepwater Drilling – Implications of the Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill, HC 450-I, para 33. 
37 Pike River report, p.268. 
38 Hunn report, p.23. 
39 Deepwater Horizon report, p.76. 
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regulating the same site or activity, particularly where each is operating a risk based 
system for allocating inspection resources. For example, in the case of Buncefield, 
the site had a lower priority for the Health and Safety Executive than it did for the 
Environment Agency. As a result, the HSE was slow to complete its assessment of 
the site, delaying the ability of the environment regulator to ask the firm to address 
particular issues.40 Although there was a memorandum of understanding in place 
between the two regulators, there was ‘scant compliance’ with it. Software 
incompatibility inhibited data sharing, communication was ‘more a case of 
“copying in” colleagues in the other agency than proactive liaison’.41 Very 
commonly, there is also a lack of clarity about which agency has lead responsibility 
for which issues.42   
Finally, failures in oversight can contribute to the difficulties of system 
management: regulators can be subject to performance or accountability measures 
which impose conflicting priorities on them, as with the MMS in the US, or which 
are incapable of identifying weaknesses as they lack the expertise to do so, as in 
the case of Pike River, or do not see it as their role, as in the case of the BIA. 
 
 
 
REGULATORY STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES 
 
At the outset, regulatory disasters were differentiated from more general policy 
disasters as they involved the failure of a regulatory regime to manage the 
behaviour or risks that it was created to manage in order to achieve a broadly 
defined goal or set of goals. There is a wide array of regulatory techniques that can 
be used to achieve those goals, each with its own strengths and vulnerabilities.    
Each of the failures involved a different regulatory technique. In the case of Deep 
Water Horizon, regulation was highly prescriptive and expressed in legislation.  
Although the regulator had pressed Congress to revise the legislation to bring it up 
to date, this had not occurred. As a result, the deep water drilling techniques that 
the industry was using were in effect unregulated as they were simply not covered 
by the relevant legislation.43 In the aftermath of the disaster, the US government 
agreed to adopt a system akin to that used in Norway and the UK, often referred 
to as ‘enforced self regulation’ or management based regulation. In such systems, 
the safety systems and processes are not prescribed in legislation, rather the 
legislation sets an overall objective, such as ‘a safe system of work’, and the duty 
holder has to present its ‘safety case’ to the regulator for approval, setting out  
how it proposes to achieve that objective. This system was introduced in the UK 
as a result of the Robens Report in 1972,44 and forms the basis of New Zealand’s 
40 Buncefield report, para 55. 
41 Ibid, para 72. 
42 Ibid, para 99, 124-5. 
43 Deepwater Horizon report, pp.71 and 75. 
44 Committee on Safety and Health at Work (Robens Committee): Report and Papers (London: HMSO).  
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health and safety regulation.45 It was widely praised by the US commission 
investigating the Deep Water Horizon disaster as the best system to use, and has 
since been adopted there. The UK also reassured itself of the strength of the 
regime in a Parliamentary review of the regulation of offshore drilling in the UK in 
the wake of the Deep Water Horizon disaster set up to see what lessons, if any, 
could be learned from it for the UK.46 
However, any strategy has an Achilles heel. One of the striking things about 
the regulatory failures relating to the supervision of banks and financial markets in 
the UK, and mines and buildings in  New Zealand, is that each was an example, at 
least from a distance, of a textbook case of ‘new regulatory governance’ 
techniques.47 Management based regulation was used both in the case of the 
regulation of the mining industry in New Zealand, and the regulation and 
supervision of RBS (and other banks) in the UK. In the case of New Zealand, 
however, the Pike River commission argued that in translating the UK system for 
health and safety regulation to the New Zealand context, it implemented a ‘light’ 
version of the system which gave flexibility by focusing on the objectives to be 
achieved, but failed to supplement this with sufficient guidance or even 
prescription as to the minimum standards necessary, or sufficient engagement of 
the workforce in compiling the safety case.48 Management based regulation works 
well where management’s incentives are sufficiently aligned with the regulators’ 
goals – however, as the FSA’s supervision of RBS showed, where they are not so 
aligned, the technique is vulnerable to failure. 
In the case of the building and mining industries, New Zealand also pulled 
back from prescribing products or processes to setting performance standards, 
more often referred to in the UK context as ‘outcomes focused’ regulation. This 
strategy involves removing a great deal of prescription from the rules, whilst 
setting overall goals to be achieved. The Pike River report found that in getting rid 
of those provisions, the regulatory system lost what might be termed its 
‘institutional memory’. It commented:  
 
The special rules and safeguards applicable to mining contained in the old 
law, based on many years of hard-won experience from past tragedies, were 
swept away by the new legislation, leaving mining operators and mining 
inspectors in limbo.49  
 
45 See online at http://www.mbie.govt.nz/pdf-library/what-we-do/workplace-health-and-safety-
reform/effective-regulatory-framework.pdf.  
46 House of Commons Energy and Climate Change Committee, UK Deepwater Drilling – Implications of the 
Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill, HC 450-I. 
47 On the UK system see Black, J (2012), ‘Paradoxes and Failures: ‘New Governance’ Techniques and the 
Financial Crisis’ (75)(6) Modern Law Review 1037. 
48 Pike River report, Vol 2, p.252; see also Pike River: Report of the Independent Taskforce on 
Workplace Health and Safety (April 2013). 
49 Pike River report, p.32. 
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Performance based or outcomes focused regulation places significant demands on 
both regulators and regulatees’ judgement and expertise. However, complex 
systems of detailed rules can be just as demanding to implement and have the 
additional disadvantage of becoming easily outdated, as in the case of the 
regulatory regime for deep water drilling in the US.50 These contrasting examples 
highlight the care that has to be taken in designing a rules-based system, to ensure 
there is the right combination of principles or outcomes-focused norms and 
sufficient ‘scaffolding’ through more detailed guidance provisions to indicate to 
firms how to comply, and assure themselves and regulators that they have done 
so.51 
A less commented-on regulatory technique, at least in the academic literature, 
is the art of monitoring and inspection. Whilst there is a considerable research on 
how to get regulated operators  to comply with regulation, there is far less on how 
regulators can assure themselves, and others, that operators  are or are not 
complying. However, a common feature across all the cases studied is poor 
monitoring strategies. In the case of Pike River, for example, inspections were on 
site, but did not involve wider audits of systems and processes, or assessments of 
firms’ culture. In the case of RBS, in contrast, oversight focused too much on 
systems and processes, and not enough on the business model.  It was also partial, 
focusing on some areas of risk, mainly retail operations where there were known 
concerns, but not others, notably capital adequacy, where the risks were seen as 
more remote (and where the supervisors had less experience).52 Similarly in 
Buncefield, the regulators were criticised for focusing on known defects rather 
than taking a strategic review of all the control measures in place, and focusing on 
lagging rather than leading indicators.53 The report recommended that there 
should be a ‘clear line of sight’ between the inspection plans and the strategic 
outcome sought’.54 
 
 
 
KNOWLEDGE, IDEAS AND UNDERSTANDINGS 
 
Regulation is a problem-based activity: ‘society’ in some form decides there is a 
problem, or that there is a risk of a problem in the future, and policy makers and 
regulators devise ways to address that problem.  But how we identify something as 
a problem is contingent on what we value (and therefore what we think is under 
threat), and how we analyse problems and create solutions for them is contingent 
on our knowledge and understanding of the world, and our ideas of how it 
51 Black, J (2008), ‘Forms and Paradoxes of Principles Based Regulation’ Capital Markets Law Journal 3(4), 
available at http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/23103/1/WPS2008-13.pdf.  
51 Black, J (2008), ‘Forms and Paradoxes of Principles Based Regulation’ Capital Markets Law Journal 3(4), 
available at http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/23103/1/WPS2008-13.pdf.  
52 RBS report, p.242. 
53 Buncefield report, para 97. 
54 Ibid, recommendation 6. 
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operates.  This applies to our understandings of regulatory disasters as it does to 
any other problem. 
Knowledge, ideas and understandings are critical in the context of risk 
regulation.  As noted above, operational drivers can be such that risks that are 
known, but considered low probability albeit high impact, are ignored not because 
they are not known about, but because a combination of assumptions about 
probabilities, understandings of impact and operational drivers means they are not 
prioritised for attention.   
More problematic, perhaps, are the risks which are known but not recognised 
as important for the regulatory system. Low risks, in particular, may escape 
attention both in the design of the regulatory regime or its operation because their 
cumulative impact is not known, or at least not recognised in that particular 
regulatory regime. For example, the Buncefield report found that the UK’s regime 
for major hazard regulation of chemical sites did not cover low risks which may 
have an incremental impact. Nor did it recognise societal risks, i.e. risks to those 
living near the site as opposed to those working on it.55 Whilst the report 
recommended that planning decisions should take account of societal risk and the 
HSE is working on technical guidance on the issue, the UK Government has yet 
to introduce such a requirement.56 Some risks are just unknown, however. The 
explosion at Buncefield, for example, was a consequence of the ignition of a large 
cloud of vapour that was formed during the loss of petrol from a storage tank. 
The circumstances which led to the release of the vapour were predictable, but the 
consequences were not. The vapour release generated much higher pressures than 
would normally have been expected from a vapour cloud explosion, and exactly 
how or why the chemical reaction occurred was still unknown at the end of the 
investigation.57 Similarly, in the case of RBS, and indeed with respect to the global 
financial crisis more broadly, assumptions that had been made as to how markets 
would react in particular scenarios proved significantly misplaced, with risk events 
that had been anticipated to occur once in several lives of the universe were 
occurring every day. In this case the causes were social rather than chemical, and it 
is a moot issue as to whether they could have been predicted had different 
modelling techniques, and a different understanding of markets had been used. 
Nonetheless, we cannot always manage uncertainty – we cannot always prevent 
disasters arising from risks that we know exist but about which we do not have 
full knowledge, nor can we manage risks that we do not know about at all.   
 
 
 
 
55 Ibid, para 146-7. 
56 See online at http://www.hse.gov.uk/landuseplanning/societalrisk.htm.  
57 Ibid, paras 19, 32, 51. 
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COMMUNICATION AND TRUST 
 
Finally, the last elements of regulatory regimes which play a role in contributing to 
disasters lie in the communication and trust (or lack thereof) that exists between 
regulators themselves, and between regulators and those they regulate, and 
between regulators and those to whom they are accountable.   
 With respect to communication, messages that different actors send as to 
the goals of the regulatory system may conflict.   The Hunn report found, for 
example, that the forward to the guidance on compliance with the Building Act 
stated that the aim of the Act was to ‘minimise compliance costs’, but it was 
unclear whether this related to the administrative costs of compliance or to the 
overall cost of design and construction compliance.58 This is a particularly 
pertinent observation for the UK, which has recently introduced a requirement for 
non-economic regulators to take into account ‘economic growth’ in the exercise of 
their functions.59 
Trust is also central to the operation of a regulatory system, but just what 
degree of trust is appropriate or ‘optimal’ is a difficult issue to manage in practice. 
Regulators may have long standing relationships with certain regulated firms, 
particularly large scale operators who are geographically fixed (mining operators in 
contrast to container ships, for example). Much research has found that regulators, 
either deliberately or less consciously, seek to build cooperative relationships with 
regulatees, and only to escalate enforcement action in response to the attitude of 
the regulatee and / or the scale of the incident.60 Although the US is often 
distinguished from other countries in this regard, it is worth noting that 
relationships between the MMS and the operators were also close, in some cases 
overly so.61 In all the examples analysed here, the reports criticised the regulators 
for being insufficiently interrogative of the information given to them by firms, 
too slow to take action once problems were identified, or not to have set out 
clearly when more formal action would be taken.62 In the case of RBS, regulators 
were simply too trusting. From mid-2006 onwards, the FSA’s supervisors assessed 
firms against criteria relating to their management and controls, and whether it had 
dealt openly with the FSA. On the basis of these assessments it decided whether, 
and to what extent, a firm could benefit from a ‘regulatory dividend’.63 The Royal 
Bank of Scotland was given a regulatory dividend in 2006-7, notwithstanding that 
relationships had in the past been highly fractious.64 In its report into the failure of 
RBS the review team declared that the concept of a regulatory dividend was 
‘flawed’ and ‘potentially dangerous’.65 It rewarded firms with less intensive 
58 Hunn report, p.18. 
59 Deregulation Bill 2014, clause 61. 
60 Ayres, I and Braithwaite, J (1992) Really Responsive Regulation (Oxford: OUP). 
61 Deepwater Horizon report, p.77. 
62 Buncefield report, para 95; Hunn report p.21. 
63 RBS report, p.257. 
64 Ibid, pp.257 and 242. 
65 FSA, RBS report, p.242. 
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supervision if they could demonstrate effective controls and displayed a degree of 
cooperation with the FSA ‘that ought to have been a non-negotiable minimum’. It 
is worth noting that ‘trust’ may be resource-driven, however: the report also noted 
that the dividend may also have been awarded to enable supervisors to manage 
conflicting pressures with limited resources.66   
 
 
 
REGULATORY DYNAMICS AND POTENTIAL POINTS OF FAILURE 
 
Although the analysis here examines each element in isolation, in reality each 
element interacts with the others to produce the unique dynamics of any 
regulatory regime. But whilst each disaster is in many ways distinct, there are some 
common sources of failure which are observable irrespective of the domain being 
regulated. In fact, the points of failure are depressingly familiar and, most 
importantly, are common to both regulators and regulated operators. Within 
organisations, these are most often inadequate training and skills of front line staff, 
conflicting incentives or incentives which conflict with the goals of the regulatory 
regime, and poor leadership and management oversight. In addition, poor internal 
coordination and communication, for example between different types of experts, 
and weak coordination between the different regulators charged with managing 
the system, are all too common.    
The disasters also illustrate the particular points of weakness of different 
regulatory techniques. For example, prescriptive regulation can quickly become 
outdated, but performance based or outcomes focused regimes requires a 
supporting scaffolding of guidance. Management-based techniques need to ensure 
that the goals of the regulator really are embedded in firms. In industries 
characterised by low probability, high impact events, they show that firms and 
regulators need to take care not to be overly distracted with managing the high 
probability, low impact events which are happening here and now. All the 
disasters also illustrate the need for consistent communication, and the 
importance, and difficulty of managing trust within and of the regulatory regime as 
a whole.   
In sum, they illustrate that regulators have to be aware of and respond to 
limitations of the capacity and attitude of regulated firms, to the weaknesses of 
their own organisational structures and processes, to the pressures imposed by the 
market, legal and political context of the regulatory system as a whole,  to the 
potential points of failure in the regulatory techniques being used, to knowledge 
and understandings of risks and markets, to the role of communication and trust 
throughout the regime, and to changes in each of these.67 The analysis also 
66 Ibid p.242. 
67 Baldwin, R and Black, J (2008), ‘Really Responsive Regulation’ 71(1) Modern Law Review 59-94. 
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suggests where those who oversee regulators should be looking for potential 
points of failure, and to the varying ability that even independent regulators may 
have to counter the pressures that politicians can place on them. But above all, it 
shows that we need to learn from disasters, wherever they happen around the 
world.  In doing so we will not prevent them from happening again, but we could 
reduce their likelihood.  
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